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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Russian personnel and structural changes reflect electoral concerns? 
President Putin issued a decree last month that raised red flags, not only for its 
content, but for its timing, as well.  Just after regional elections were held across 
Russia, Putin created the Federal Service for the Mass Media–melding the 
Federal Service for Media Law Compliance and Cultural Heritage 
(Rosookhrankultura) and the Federal Information Technologies Agency 
(Rossvyaznadzor).   The new agency will regulate a variety of media (print, 
television, radio and internet), controlling both the issuance of licenses and the 
content broadcast by these media.  (1)  
 
Particularly for the televised media, whose freedom of operation (from ownership 
to content) repeatedly and systematically has been curtailed by the Putin 
administration, the new agency represents an extra level of regulatory hoops, as 
well as a new set of regulators, to contend with in licensing.  There is some 
speculation that this presidential decree represents an attempt to mediate a 
bureaucratic dispute in broadcast licensing, as outlets begin to switch to digital.  
(2) 
 
The issue of Internet control is another element of this new agency's oversight 
that is reminiscent of SORM and SORM-2 and the earlier attempts (dating back 
to the Yel'tsin administration) by FAPSI and the FSB to regulate the Internet in 
Russia by compelling media outlets to purchase equipment that allowed the FSB 
to conduct surveillance through mobile and wireless devices, and other Internet 
access points.  (3)  
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Russia's Information Security Doctrine, endorsed in 2000, addresses some key 
issues in control over media sources that may speak volumes to the timing of 
Putin's recent decree.  Mindful of the Russian response to the Orange and Rose 
revolutions, particularly Moscow's claims of foreign interference, remarks by 
President Putin and then-Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov at the time of 
the release of the Information Security Doctrine seem either prescient or 
paranoid.  In outlining the need for an aggressive Information Security Doctrine, 
Putin identified the role of information in projecting global leadership: "information 
resources and infrastructure have become an arena for the struggle for world 
leadership. It is obvious that in such a complex sphere as information, 
controversy between states might arise." (4) 
 
At one of the Security Council sessions where the doctrine was discussed, 
Sergei Ivanov stressed the importance of the ability of the state to have its voice 
heard in the media: "the state has lately lost the potentialities for clarifying its 
politics, the state's position on domestic and foreign political issues." (5) 
 
It seems possible that Putin's team found something in the coverage of the 
recent regional elections to be either unacceptable or uncontrollable and acted to 
exert tighter supervision.  In any event, centralization of control for its own sake 
apparently is an esteemed objective in Putin's Kremlin. 
 
Of course, at the time of the creation of the information security doctrine and 
announcement of SORM regulations, at least Russia had different security 
organs in control of the surveillance and content regulations, and therefore had a 
semblance of counterbalance to a single authority's decisions in the critical 
sphere of mass communications.  However, with the absorption of FAPSI (in 
particular its supervision and authority over the electronic information, emergency 
and electoral systems nationwide) into the FSB, the position of "Chekhists" within 
the Russian government, characterized by one respected analyst as "stable," 
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could now perhaps be seen as secure. (6)  Despite its seeming unassailable 
position, it is clear the Kremlin  is seeking to sew up any loose threads that might 
lead to their undoing in elections next year. 
 
Personnel moves come fast and furious 
Putin's decision to move Sergei Ivanov from the Defense Ministry to a First 
Deputy post in the Government has captured a great deal of attention in the 
debate over possible presidential successors.  However, there has been a series 
of lesser publicized changes that may speak just as loudly to the future 
governance of Russia. 
 
Perhaps most notably, the long time head of the Central Election Commission 
(CEC), Alexander Veshnyakov, was ousted from his post hard on the heels of the 
March regional elections.  Veshnyakov described his last meeting with Putin, 
where they discussed the regional elections and in which Veshnyakov told Putin 
he was ready to continue his work at the CEC.  Within a few days, when Putin 
submitted his list of candidates for the CEC, it did not include the current 
chairman.  Apparently, Putin did not inform Veshnyakov of his intentions.  
According to Veshnyakov, "The decision was not made then.  Now it has been 
made."  (7) 
 
For the new term, Putin appointed Igor Borisov, Stanislav Vavilov, Vasili Volkov, 
Maya Grishina and Igor Fyodorov as his representatives to the CEC. (8)  His 
selection to head up the Commission is, perhaps not surprisingly, an associate 
from St. Petersburg, Vladimir Churov, who served as Putin's Deputy in the 
1990s, when Putin was Senior Deputy to St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoli Sobchak.  
(9) 
 
Another election bellwether industry, arms sales, clearly was shaken by the 
removal of Sergei Ivanov from the Defense Ministry.  Although his position as 
First Deputy Prime Minister provides for general oversight of the military sector of 
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the economy, Ivanov's departure appears to have provided an opportunity for 
others to scramble for more hands-on control.  Prime Minister Fradkov, who, as 
has been noted previously, clearly sees his position as elevated with the 
president's decision to pit Medvedev and Ivanov directly against each other in the 
government, recently put his own appointee, Aleksandr Denisov, at the head of 
the Federal Agency for the Delivery of Arms and Special Equipment. (10) 
 
The head of Russia's main arms export agency, Rosoboroneksport, also seems 
to be making some political noise.  Sergei Chemezov, a longtime Putin 
associate, recently announced that he is setting up an organization, comprised in 
part of the Russian Machine Builders Union, which, at its creation, will entail 
approximately 80 companies from the military industrial complex, shipbuilding 
sectors and select banking concerns.  (11)  
 
It is interesting to note that diverse streams of income and outflow from arms 
sales tend to suggest a real contest for succession within the Russian political 
and security elite, especially when so many other elements of the state are 
grasping for stricter central oversight.    When control of such a prodigious 
industry is in a variety of hands, it becomes more difficult to ensure an orderly, 
managed succession.  Perhaps for this very reason, the leaders of Yel'tsin's 
administration in the late 1990s fought to reconsolidate control of military 
equipment transfers.  It is too early to project the continued success of these 
independent revenue sources and therefore elite successor candidates; it 
certainly remains a possibility that Putin and his team will decide to reassert 
Kremlin control via one single agency.  The issue then may prove to be whether 
or not the industry responds to the Kremlin's directives. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Russian president decrees to merge two federal supervision services," ITAR-
TASS, 12 Mar 07; OSC Transcribed text via World News Connection; "'Super 
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agency' threatens Russian freedom," International Herald Tribune, 24 Mar 07 via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; "Not so great expectations," The Moscow 
Times, 20 Mar 07 via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(2) "Not so great expectations," Ibid. 
(3) Moscow Rossiiskaya gazeta in Russian 29 Aug 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0829 via 
ISCIP Database. For more on SORM and SORM-2, please see The NIS 
Observed archives, searchable via www.bu.edu/iscip. 
(4) "President Outlines Objectives of new Doctrine," Moscow ITAR-TASS in 
Russian 1218 GMT 23 Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0623 via ISCIP Database. 
(5) Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1454 GMT 23 Jun 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0623 
via ISCIP Database.  
(6) See Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "The Power of the Chekhists is incredibly stable", 
Kommersant-Vlast, No. 10, March 19-25, 2007. 
(7) "Two terms in office to be unwritten rule for CEC Chief—Veshnyakov," ITAR-
TASS, 15 Mar 07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) "Nothing is more important than your background," by Boris Vishnevsky, 
Novaya Gazeta, No. 22, March 29, 2007, p. 9; What the Papers Say (WPS) via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. 
(10) "Denisov Appointed to Head Arms Delivery Agency," Interfax, 26 Mar 07; 
OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(11) "Chemezov's party," By Natalia Melikova, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 Mar 07; 
WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; Also, report of Melikova article by 
Financial Times Information; BBC Monitoring International Reports, 3 Apr 07. 
(See The ISCIP Analyst, particularly 25 Jan 07 issue at www.bu.edu/iscip for 
information on the Putin-Chemezov connection.) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
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By Robyn Angley 
 
Whatever happened to Kukly? 
A new television series has aired in Russia over the past several months. Titled 
Stalin Live, the series depicts Stalin, near the end of his life, looking back over 
key moments. Included in those moments is a scene that dramatizes a fictional 
Stalin bidding an emotional farewell to his son Yakov before Yakov heads to the 
front in World War II. "If you have to die, do it with dignity," says Stalin in 
Georgian. "And you must be confident that your father, Stalin, will do everything 
for our victory." (1) 
 
Stalin Live's director, Grigori Lyubomirov, is an unexpected face to find behind 
the new series. Lyubomirov was the director of NTV's Kukly, the puppet show 
whose political satire eventually got it ousted from NTV's line-up, apparently after 
objections were raised by Putin himself. Lyubomirov's other contributions include 
Russia's first reality television show, Behind Glass (Za Steklom), and, more 
recently, Rublyovka, a show depicting the ultra-rich inhabitants of Moscow's 
Rublyovskoye Shosse.  
 
Sources for the Stalin Live series include historical accounts, among them 
interviews given by Stalin's bodyguards. Director Grigori Lyubomirov commented 
about the show's sympathetic viewpoint. "According to the information that we 
have, Stalin in the last months of his life came to repentance. He rethought his 
life from the position of a man of faith," said Lyubomirov. (2)  
 
The show reflects a rising interest in alternative portrayals of the Stalinist legacy, 
certainly a very political issue during Khrushchev's reign, and one which saw 
numerous revelations in the glasnost' era. Current attitudes toward Stalin seem 
to reflect more ambivalence toward or approval of the dictator than 
disapprobation. A study conducted by Sarah Mendelson and Theodore Gerber 
unearthed some interesting findings. According to the two scholars, "about half 
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(51 percent) of the respondents agreed that Stalin was a wise leader, whereas 
39 percent disagreed. Over half (56 percent) said they thought he did more good 
than bad; only 33 percent disagreed. And 42 percent of those surveyed agreed 
that people today exaggerate Stalin's role in the repressions, whereas about the 
same number (37 percent) disagreed. Opinions were about equally divided over 
whether Stalin was a cruel tyrant (43 percent agreed and 47 percent disagreed) -
- a strange finding given that 70 percent of the respondents agreed that Stalin 
imprisoned, tortured, and killed millions of innocent people (only 16 percent 
disagreed with this claim). Only 28 percent felt that Stalin did not deserve credit 
for the Soviet victory in World War II." (3) 
 
In light of these findings, popular interest in the revisionist take on Stalin's legacy 
is not surprising, only sad.  
    
The series also has stirred up trouble in Georgia, where the television station 
Rustavi-2 has drawn criticism from members of the parliamentary majority for 
broadcasting a show that portrays Stalin in such a favorable light. The 14 
February edition of Rustavi-2's news show Kurieri included an interview about the 
show with the station's General Director Koba Davarashvili. “This film gives us a 
chance to understand what Stalin was thinking about, whom he hated and whom 
he loved; [the film gives a chance] to find out whether Stalin was really bad – a 
notion which has been put in our minds for so many years - but it turns out that 
he wasn’t,” the director said. (4)  
 
Repeat after me: There are no National Bolsheviks 
The newspaper Kommersant has been issued a reprimand for using the phrase 
"National Bolsheviks" in its coverage of events sponsored by Eduard Limonov 
and his followers. According to a letter from the deputy head of the Federal 
Service for Supervision of Compliance with the Law in the sphere of Mass 
Communications and Preservation of Cultural Heritage, Aleksandr Romanenkov, 
there is no party with such a name in Russia. Therefore, media coverage using 
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that phrase potentially is open to charges of spreading false public information. 
(5) 
 
The rebuff to Kommersant is part of an increased effort by authorities to crack 
down on the National Bolsheviks. The Moscow prosecutor's office recently 
announced its intention to declare Limonov's group an extremist organization and 
to impose a ban on its activities. (6)  The group already was officially disbanded 
by state authorities in 2005. As lawyer Natalia Barshchevskaya queried, "What 
do they mean by pressing charges against an organization that doesn't formally 
exist?" (7) 
 
The newest attempts to suppress the National Bolsheviks, labeled as fascists by 
some Russian liberals, were sparked by the group's participation in the 
Dissenters' March in Saint Petersburg on 3 March. The event, which was banned 
by city authorities, protested against Vladimir Putin and close Putin associate and 
Mayor of Saint Petersburg Valentina Matvienko. Estimates of the number of 
participants in the protest range from 1,000 by local officials, to 15,000 by the 
sponsoring opposition groups. OMON units were called in to shut down the 
march and over 100 individuals were placed under arrest, mostly for minor 
technicalities carrying penalties of two weeks or so in jail. (8)  In further evidence 
of decreasing media freedom in Russia, at least one journalist lost her job 
because of her decision to cover the protests. (9) 
 
The march was sponsored by an association of Russian opposition groups called 
Other Russia. The Other Russia coalition is comprised of a group of unlikely 
bedfellows: the People's Democratic Union of Mikhail Kasyanov, the United Civil 
Front of Garry Kasparov and the National Bolsheviks of Eduard Limonov. 
Kasyanov, Prime Minister from 2000-2004 and a protégé of the Yel'tsin "family," 
is trying (rather unsuccessfully) to position himself as the leader of a viable 
opposition. Chess champion Garry Kasparov long has been looking for an 
alternative to Putin, aligning himself with parties such as the democratic Union of 
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Right Forces in the past. Eduard Limonov, on the other hand, has a checkered 
career. Originally a poet and novelist, Limonov became engaged in 
ultranationalist political activism. He was imprisoned early in Putin's presidency 
for attempting to stage an invasion of Kazakhstan. Limonov's National Bolsheviks 
are truly unlikely allies for Kasyanov and Kasparov's tamer followers. 
 
However, it may be precisely because of the improbable cooperation between 
the National Bolsheviks and other opposition groups that Limonov and his 
supporters are being hounded once again by the authorities. They are the 
easiest segment of the opposition to target because of their sensationalist 
behavior. Currently, the court date to review the case of the "non-existent" 
National Bolshevik party is set for April 18. The outcome, while sure to be 
unfavorable to Limonov's group, remains to be seen.  
 
Source Notes:  
 
(1) David Holley, "TV series on Stalin divides Russian audience," Los Angeles 
Times, 30 Mar 07 via http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-
stalin30mar30,0,1239785.story?coll=la-home-headlines.  
(2) Anna Malpas, "Swan song for Stalin," Moscow Times, 26 Jan 07 via 
http://context.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/01/26/103.html. 
(3) Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, "Failing the Stalin test," 
Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 06. 
(4) "Lustration amid Stalin debates," Civil Georgia, 17 Feb 07. 
(5) "Russian National Bolsheviks to keep working despite ban on party name – 
leader," Ren TV, 30 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) "Moscow wants National Bolsheviks banned as extremists, their leader is 
indignant," Ekho Moskvy, 22 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(7) "Reprimand," Kommersant, 30 Mar 07; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) 24 News Report, "Russia more than 100 arrested at St. Petersburg," Ren TV, 
4 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(9) "Russian journalist sacked for covering St. Petersburg Dissenters' March," 
Ekho Moskvy, 7 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis; The ISCIP Analyst, 
Executive Branch, Vol. XIII, No. 9 (8 Mar 07) via www.bu.edu/iscip. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
GRU in decline 
During the past two years, several events have occurred that indicate that the 
GRU, until now considered one of Russia’s last remaining elite intelligence units, 
in fact has been undergoing steady decline. In March of 2004, two GRU officers 
carrying Secret Service, rather than diplomatic, passports were arrested in 
Yemen and deported to Qatar. Charged by the Qatari authorities with the 
assassination of former Chechen President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the 
detainees reportedly revealed operational secrets while under interrogation. (1)  
Then, in September 2006, Georgian authorities arrested four Russian nationals, 
allegedly GRU operatives, who were on the verge of executing a major act of 
“provocation” against the Republic. As they had been in Yemen, the officers 
concerned apparently were working without diplomatic cover, or sufficient 
financial and logistical support from their superiors in Moscow. Responding to the 
crisis, GRU veterans claimed that the intelligence failure was a result of failure to 
maintain the agency’s previously  “stringent” recruiting standards. The GRU now 
recruited “anyone at all.” (2)  
    
On 3 April, a report on Ekho Moskvy radio claimed that the hazing and bullying 
which has long plagued Russia’s conscript forces, has spread into the GRU. 
Apparently, senior contract soldiers are demanding daily payments in excess of 
R500 from junior contractees. Because these amounts exceed their salaries, 
junior soldiers are resorting to criminal activities—including muggings—in nearby 
Yekaterinburg, in order to meet the costs. The report also claimed that junior 
 11 
troops are subjected to regular beatings by their superiors. (3)  If this report is 
true—and at this juncture there is no reason to doubt its veracity—it confirms 
GRU veterans’ worst fears regarding recruitment. Taken together with the 
operational failures described above, this report indicates that GRU apparently 
lacks political and financial support at the highest levels of the Russian 
government. If GRU is unable to function, its will to resist any FSB takeover 
attempts will become ever harder to sustain. 
 
Basayev “assassination” revisited 
On 10 July 2006, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev informed President Vladimir 
Putin that Shamil Basayev had been killed in the course of a special operation. 
According to FSB sources, Basayev was tracked through his cell phone. When 
his location had been confirmed, a smart missile was fired, destroying the truck in 
which he was traveling.  
    
The FSB’s account was disputed by Ingush President Bashir Aushev, as well as 
Kommersant; they claimed that the truck had exploded as the result of “careless 
handling of explosives” by the militants—in other words, an accident—and that 
the FSB had not arrived on site until 6 hours after the explosion. It seemed likely 
that the FSB was claiming the “kill” as a means to re-gain political capital in the 
Kremlin, after the debacle at Beslan. (4)  
    
In the last few weeks, the FSB has sought to silence the doubters by releasing a 
detailed report in which its “targeted killing” operation is described at some 
length; supposedly, the FSB had succeeded in infiltrating Basayev’s gang some 
time before his death. The FSB’s informer apparently passed information to 
Moscow indicating that a second Beslan type operation was in the works. (5)  
This intelligence prompted action. With the mole’s information, the FSB was able 
to pinpoint Basayev’s location.  
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A team of operatives was dispatched to the scene. The driver of the truck being 
used to transport weapons and explosives for the terror operation was drugged, 
apparently by two female agents disguised as local waitresses. (6)  While he was 
incapacitated, the FSB photographed and catalogued the equipment in the 
KamAZ vehicle, which included assault rifles, grenades and plastic explosives. At 
this time, the FSB operatives planted their own device in the truck and then 
returned it to its original location. (7) 
 
Although the report does not describe how the FSB’s device was detonated, it is 
safe to assume—if this story is true—that a surveillance team shadowed the 
truck, waiting for Basayev to be collected, and that the bomb was exploded using 
a remote trigger device, when Basayev boarded his transportation.  
    
The version of events as described by the FSB seems fantastic, indeed, worthy 
of a Hollywood script. To train an operative to infiltrate a terror cell—especially in 
a clan-based, tribal society—would take months, if not years, with an extremely 
high level of planning and low chance of success. The surveillance and “kill” 
teams would need to be highly trained, patient individuals, with precise, accurate 
information. If the press reports are to be believed, the FSB personnel indeed 
had done the background work, rehearsing the operation for “some time.” (8)  
    
If the description of events carried in the press is true, then the FSB’s 
competency must be seriously re-evaluated. It is a possibility—however 
remote—that a trusted member of Basayev’s retinue was "turned," or that the 
FSB succeeded in an infiltration. Given the FSB’s past record however, its claims 
must be viewed with healthy skepticism. 
 
Litvinenko: Berezovsky questioned… 
Last month, Russian officials complained that permission had not been granted 
for law-enforcement officers to question suspects in the murder of Aleksandr 
Litvinenko in London. British authorities responded to these complaints by 
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explaining that the Crown Prosecution Service had imposed a delay, while it 
asked detectives to uncover more evidence. (9)  Any delays apparently had been 
cleared by the last week of March, when a three-man delegation, headed by 
Deputy Prosecutor General Aleksandr Zvyagintsev, arrived in London. (10)  
    
After meeting with Scotland Yard detectives and Crown Prosecution Service 
officials, the delegation was permitted to question exiled oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky and Chechen “emissary” Akhmed Zakayev, at separate, secure 
locations. (11)  While Russian officials pronounced themselves satisfied with 
Berezovsky’s interview, stating that “the interrogation passed off ok,” (12) the 
tycoon, as could be expected, gave a very different reaction. Berezovsky claimed 
that the investigators had been more interested in his businesses, bank accounts 
and companies, and had asked him about President Putin’s alleged involvement 
in the murder only at the end of the interview, making the whole session a 
complete “farce.” (13) 
 
While prosecutor airs “new” theory about the murder 
Several days after Berezovsky had been questioned by the Deputy Prosecutor 
General in London, a television program aired in Russia, and “sourced” to the 
Prosecutor’s office, claiming that Berezovsky had been behind the murder. A 
news program on Rossiya TV used an anonymous witness, “Petr,” to allege that 
Berezovsky had ordered Litvinenko’s death because the latter could damage his 
asylum case. “Petr” claimed that he was a former FSB agent, sent to kill 
Berezovsky. “Petr” stated that he had revealed his identity to a journalist, who 
had passed a recording of their conversation to Berezovsky. This tape was then 
used in Berezovsky’s asylum hearing to show that his life was endangered. (14) 
 
Berezovsky has responded to the show by outing “Petr” as Vladimir Teplyuk, a 
Russian living in London, (15) and by stating that he intends to sue Rossiya TV. 
(16)  It should be noted that Berezovsky did not comment on Teplyuk’s FSB 
status, or lack thereof.  
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In spite of claims to the contrary, this theory is not “new.” The claim that 
Litvinenko was killed to enhance Berezovsky’s asylum claims was aired by the 
Kremlin in November. What is new is the wheeling out of a “witness.” By any 
legalistic logic, airing this theory on television damages its credibility. Moreover, 
the Teplyuk “story” makes little sense. If Berezovsky was indeed targeted, his 
asylum claims were legitimate – and could not have been exposed as a “fraud” 
by Litvinenko. The question needs to be asked: what is Moscow’s motivation? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19 Mar 04 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. (See The NIS Observed, Volume IX, Number 05 (26 Mar 04).)  
(2) Imedi TV, Tbilisi in Georgian 1500 GMT, 27 Sep 06; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis. (See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 4 (9 Nov 06).) 
(3) “Bullying Reported At Russian Military Intelligence Unit,” Ekho Moskvy, in 
Russian, 3 Apr 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 7 (20 Jul 06)  
(5) “Shamil Basayev And The Dead Man’s Chest,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 26 
Mar 07; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Report Tells How FSB Targeted Basayev,” The Moscow Times, 27 Mar 07 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) “Shamil Basayev And The Dead Man’s Chest,” Moskovskii komsomolets, 26 
Mar 07; WPS Defense and Security via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 10 (29 Mar 07)  
(10) “Russian Investigators in London Over Litvinenko Murder,” ITAR-TASS, 27 
Mar 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) “British Police Confirm Berezovsky, Zakayev Questioning,” ITAR-TASS, 1 
Apr 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
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(12) “Russian Investigators Satisfied With Interview With UK-Based 
Businessman,” Interfax, 30 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(13) “Émigré Tycoon Slams His Questioning By Russian Investigator As Waste 
Of Time,” Ekho Moskvy, in Russian, 31 Mar 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(14) “New ‘Television Theory’ About Alexandr Litvinenko’s Murder,”  Vremya 
novosti, 2 Apr 07; What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.  
(15) “Fugitive Tycoon Names Man Who Accused Him On Russian TV,” NTV Mir, 
in Russian, 2 Apr 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) “Berezovsky To Sue Russian TV Channel Over Litvinenko Claims,” Agence 
France Presse, 3 Apr 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces (Internal) 
By Monty Perry 
 
Personnel reform…a misguided effort  
This week marked the beginning of the Russian military’s spring conscription 
campaign.  This is historic in that it is also the first recruitment campaign to enlist 
soldiers for eighteen months, instead of the more familiar two year period. (1)  
This week, President Putin signed a decree officially reducing the enlistment 
period even further, to only 12 months, beginning in 2008. (2)  Recognizing the 
need for reforms as long ago as 2001, Putin also directed a gradual shift to a 
military comprised more of contracted professional soldiers. (3)  Not surprisingly, 
however, young men are still not lining up by the masses in front of recruitment 
offices. Neither decreased enlistment terms nor a half-hearted effort toward a 
volunteer force are likely to unseat generations of corrupt leadership practices. 
      
The Defense Ministry’s stated goal is a one million man military. (4)  By 2008, the 
Russian military is expected to consist of 400,000 officers, 200,000 contract 
soldiers, and 400,000 conscripts. (5)  Despite ambitious efforts, the initial 
recruiting goal of 144,000 contract volunteer soldiers was first forced down to 
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133,000, and then again to 125,000. (6)  Moreover, the current contract soldier 
manning level remains at just 78,000. (7)  In order to make up for these 
decreased recruiting goals and the failure to meet them, conscription 
requirements have been dramatically increased.  Additionally, human rights 
groups have reported that conscripts are now routinely being coerced into 
signing contracts.  These “volunteers” already are having to seek protection from 
abuse by their superiors. (8)   
      
In one recent case, a contract soldier deserted from his reconnaissance battalion 
to escape beatings and extortion by senior soldiers.  The soldier reported that “he 
and other draftees were actually forced to sign contracts because they were told 
that otherwise no money and allowances would be given to them.” (9)  Ironically, 
even then “senior soldiers often took salaries from rookies and forced them to 
bring [an additional] 500 rubles a day.  To get the necessary amount, the newly 
drafted soldiers had to…steal money from local residents.” (10)   
     
In another case, a soldier explained to a representative of the Soldiers’ Mothers 
Committee the unexpected welcome he received upon arriving to his unit in St. 
Petersburg.  After being beaten, he was given a telephone with which he was to 
negotiate prices and arrange for rendezvous as a male prostitute.  As expected, 
the profits were then extorted by the more senior soldiers.  Experts agree that 
this practice is very common and mostly goes unreported, due to the humiliating 
nature of this sexual abuse. (11)  
      
State and political officials claim that shorter conscription periods will serve to 
minimize the number of hazing incidents.  They suggest that shorter enlistments 
will put the soldiers on a more even playing field. (12)  However, the more likely 
situation is that soldiers will simply reach “senior” status and become instigators 
with just six months experience, instead of one year.  Long-held abusive 
practices will not disappear as long as high level leaders are both condoning and 
profiting from them.   
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Captain Viktor Bobrov, commander of a motorized infantry company, recently 
took his own life “to avoid embezzlement charges he claimed were concocted by 
his superiors to cover up their wrongdoing.” (13)  In his suicide note he said, 
“Nobody is responsible for anything.  All officers do is collect money from soldiers 
and their parents; all they think about is how to steal more.” (14)  It’s too early to 
evaluate the effects of shorter conscription terms, but in January alone, 67 
military personnel committed suicide. (15)  This spike is almost triple the 2005 
monthly average of 23.   
      
The change to one-year enlistments brings with it a couple of other unintended 
negative consequences.  First, since half the service length equates to twice the 
required number of conscripts, the Defense Ministry will need to enlist 700,000 
troops next year.  With only 718,000 men reaching the age of 18 in 2008, virtually 
all young men will be required to serve. (16)  This fact will not be appreciated by 
the bribe-taking recruiters accustomed to exempting large numbers of young 
men for the right price.  Additionally, a large portion of the newly eligible 18 year-
olds will have conditions limiting their ability to serve.  In February, “Russian Air 
Force commander Col Gen Vladimir Mikhailov stunned the Kremlin 
establishment with a blunt speech.  Of the 11,000 young men drafted into the Air 
Force in 2006…more than 30 percent were ‘mentally unstable.’  An additional 10 
percent suffered from drug or alcohol problems, while a further 15 percent were 
deemed ill or malnourished.” (17)  So not only will the ranks be difficult to fill, but 
it’s very likely they will continue to be filled by young men who would rather be 
anywhere other than the military.   
     
The other anticipated problem is the increased unrest likely to result as 
conscripts under different terms of enlistment are forced to live and work 
together.  Troops serving two year enlistments will be apt to view it as unfair that 
twelve month draftees get to go home at the same time they do. (18)  For this 
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reason, hazing incidents are likely to remain very prevalent for at least a few 
years during the transition.   
      
As the title of this article implies, continued efforts at “fixing” personnel problems 
are aimed at the wrong target.  The young, underpaid, abused, and bitter 
conscript can not be expected to be a catalyst for change.  Instead, it’s all about 
leadership.  And the current leadership likes things just the way they are.   
      
The officer corps in the Russian military comprises an incredible 40 percent of 
the total force. (19)  By any standard this is quite excessive. This distorted 
proportion creates a situation where there is nearly one officer for every enlisted 
man.  For comparison purposes only, the US military officer corps represents just 
15 percent of the total force.  This ratio is much more typical of the rest of the 
world’s militaries. 
      
Genuine reform in the Russian military is going to require correcting the ratio of 
officers to enlisted troops.  This action alone could produce positive results.  
First, with fewer officers available to accomplish the mission, maybe they 
wouldn’t have time to victimize soldiers through the operation of their corrupt side 
businesses.  More importantly though, the money saved by reducing the size of 
the officer corps would be enough to correct enlisted pay and create a more 
professional force.   
      
As Russia continues its attempt to reemerge as a significant military power, it 
must realize that throwing money at new weapons systems and tweaking soldier 
conscription policies is not the answer.  Effective change must begin with the 
leadership. 
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By Daniel DeBree 
 
Kodori attack raises many questions 
The situation in the Kodori Gorge (Georgian territory claimed by Abkhaz 
secessionists) was in the news again last month, with reports of a night 
helicopter attack and multiple artillery rounds landing in and around the 
Georgian-held village of Chkhalta. (1)  Occurring near midnight on the 11th of 
March, the attack is notable due to the sophisticated avionics required to conduct 
it.  For this reason, the Georgian government has claimed that the helicopters 
must have come from Russian territory and been equipped with night-vision 
navigation and targeting equipment.  Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 
called this action a “dangerous and far-reaching provocation,” while Georgian 
Parliamentary speaker Nino Burdzhanadze said that Georgian authorities 
expected an “explanation of the incident” from Russia. (2)  Foreign ministers from 
both countries discussed the incident via telephone, although no details are 
available on the outcome of this conversation.  The Georgian foreign minister 
does claim, however, to have “undeniable evidence” that the attack originated in 
Russia.  (3) 
 
The Deputy Commander of Russia’s ground forces, Lieutenant General Valeri 
Yevnevich disputed the statements, claiming that helicopters from the Collective 
Peacekeeping Force have not flown in the Kodori Gorge since January 2000.  (4)  
Furthermore, he alleged that it would be impossible for helicopters based in 
Russia to attack the Kodori Gorge, due to the high elevation of the Caucasian 
Ridge that separates the two countries.  And finally, General Yevnevich claimed 
that artillery fire into the Kodori Gorge was not possible, at least from Tkvarcheli 
(where the Georgians state the fire originated), due to the intervening terrain.  
The matter was simply one of “small automatic weapons fire,” as observed by the 
106th and 107th observation posts that night. (5) 
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All of these points may be relevant, but the Georgians, too, have some significant 
evidence, although it may not qualify as irrefutable.  They state that parts of AT-
16 Ataka missiles, which were produced in Russia in 2005, were found at the 
sight of the attack.  The AT-16 is a radio command guided missile used on the 
Mi-28N and possibly Mi-24PN attack helicopters.  Both of these systems are 
equipped with advanced night-fighting equipment, but would they be able to 
climb to the altitude required to over fly the Caucasian Ridge?  The answer is 
“Yes,” but is also irrelevant, as there are many other routes to accomplish the 
same mission. (6)  In fact, the nearest Russian airfield to the Kodori Gorge is not 
north across the Caucasian ridge, but west at Sochi—Adler, which is less than 
120 nautical miles from the gorge, across relatively low terrain.  
 
The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Joint Fact-Finding Group 
(JFFG), for its part, has examined the site of the attack and stated that “additional 
information” is needed before it will be able to issue a final statement. (7)  
Although UNOMIG officials examined more than seventeen different impact 
points and the damaged administration building of the Abkhaz government-in-
exile, they did not comment on the Georgian claim of AT-16 missiles.  They have, 
however, collected evidence to determine the type of ordnance used in the attack 
and have done crater analysis to determine from which direction the attack 
originated. (8) 
 
Although Russian ordnance in this area of the world is a very common sight, only 
Russia would have the motive and the capability to conduct this type of attack, 
very specifically aimed at the government-in-exile established by the Georgians 
after their “police action” of last July.  Military expert Temur Iakobashvili claims 
that UNOMIG “might prefer to stay neutral on the issue” because it must 
represent many sides and is having difficulty reaching a consensus.  The 
possibility exists, he admits, that UNOMIG simply may need more time to finish 
the investigation. (9)  The fact that UNOMIG feels the need to arrive at 
“consensus” during a fact-finding mission, however, does seem strange and 
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throws into question UNOMIG’s objectivity.  Delaying the release of the JFFG’s 
results also may be attributed to the upcoming review of the UNOMIG mandate, 
which occurs once every six months and is currently scheduled for the 10th of 
April.  The group was originally supposed to issue a report during the week of 19-
24 March. (10) 
 
Regardless of the identity of the true perpetrators of the March 11th attack in the 
upper Kodori Gorge, a few things seem clear.   It’s obvious that the target of the 
attack was the Georgian-installed government.  The fact that the building was not 
completely destroyed is notable, but without further information, it is difficult to tell 
whether this was an intentional limitation on the use of force.  The key will be 
whether or not the building was damaged by artillery fire or by AT-16 missiles.  If 
the former, then it is conceivable that this was simply the less-than-optimal result 
achieved by an unsophisticated weapon.  If the building was hit by the AT-16, 
however, which is a highly accurate, precision-guided weapon, then the limited 
damage might be assessed as intentional.  
 
Also glaringly obvious is the Russian assertion that “only small arms fire” was 
observed on that night by the 106th and 107th observation posts.  At least 17, 
and possibly up to 29, weapons exploded in the Kodori Gorge that night, all of 
them big enough to leave a crater. (11)  Even if these weapons were not 
launched by helicopters, it would be impossible for a trained observer (or even an 
untrained one) to mistake this type of high explosive power for small arms fire. 
The soldiers at these two posts are either extremely inept or extremely biased, 
but whichever the case, UNOMIG’s effectiveness is seriously questioned.  In any 
case, this incident seems to portend future events with the onset of the spring 
thaw. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Crisis tests Russo-Ukrainian relations  
On Friday, April 6, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone 
conversation with his Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yushchenko, the main topic of 
which was the ongoing political crisis in Ukraine. According to Putin’s press 
service, the Ukrainian crisis is “…causing serious concern and worry due to the 
potential negative consequences it could have for the Ukrainian economy and 
social sector, and for the ongoing and consistent development of Russian-
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Ukrainian cooperation.” (1) Having thus expressed his concern, Putin went on to 
emphasize his “sincere desire to see the situation normalize as rapidly as 
possible,” and said that “…he was hopeful that all the branches of power in 
Ukraine would act responsibly in the interest of resolving the crisis exclusively 
through political and constitutional means and through constructive dialogue.” (2) 
 
It is hardly surprising, of course, that the recent events in Ukraine should be 
watched closely and discussed in Ukraine’s neighbor to the east. Earlier, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry expressed concern in a manner similar to the 
president's, suggesting on April 3 that "a compromise in Ukraine should be 
heeded by all sides in the interests of the stability of Ukrainian society." (3)  
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking during an official visit to Armenia, even 
offered to help – though taking care to mention that “the final decision is up to 
Ukraine.” (4)  His offer of help, if asked by Ukrainians, was interpreted by some 
as a threat to intervene, à la Hungary 1956. 
 
Not all, however, are this oblique about where their sympathies lie. On the same 
day that the two presidents spoke, the Duma “overwhelmingly” supported a 
resolution calling Yushchenko’s decision on April 2 to dissolve the Ukrainian 
parliament “unconstitutional” and warning that the Ukrainian president’s actions 
were destabilizing the country. (5)  Boris Gryzlov, president of the Duma, warned 
of "risks leading to clashes between citizens in the streets," (6) while Communist 
Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov referred to the recent crisis as "a second wave 
of orange leprosy." (7) Andrei Kokoshin, head of the Duma's committee on CIS 
affairs, was likewise unequivocal, noting that the current crisis really began in 
November 2004, when “the Orange forces trampled on the country's constitution 
and when the foundation of political instability was laid.” (8) 
 
Neither was such alarmist language and such contempt for the “orange forces” 
limited to government circles. An analytical article in the online daily Kommersant 
on April 3 compared the current situation in Ukraine to that in Moscow in October 
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1993, noting reports in the Ukrainian media that special police detachments from 
the Donetsk region had been brought into Kiev in buses. (9)  Zygar concludes the 
article by warning that “it is clear that dissolving the Upper Rada could lead to 
Ukraine itself dissolving into chaos.” (10) 
 
On April 5, Vladimir Solovyev, as part of the K Baryeru television program on 
NTV Mir, hosted a debate between SPS party leader Boris Nemtsov and 
Konstantin Zatulin of United Russia about what role, if any, Russia should play in 
the Ukrainian crisis. Nemtsov, who had supported the pro-Yushchenko forces in 
2004, now made it very clear that he does not support Yushchenko’s decision to 
dissolve the parliament. He also indicated his disapproval of Yulia Tymoshenko, 
accusing her of ruining the Ukrainian economy through excessive meddling and 
stating that he would have recommended dismissing her, had he been 
Yushchenko’s adviser. (11)  As to what the Russian position should be, however, 
Nemtsov argued for a hands-off approach, declaring that is "not for us, nor for 
you, nor for me to get involved." (12)  Ironically, Nemtsov, supposedly a member 
of the Russian opposition, found himself applauding Putin’s approach to the 
Ukrainian crisis—calling it “"more careful and wiser" than in 2004 (13)—in 
conversation with a member of the pro-presidential party. For his part, Zatulin 
was rather dismissive of the achievements of Ukraine’s “orange forces,” and at 
one point rolled his eyes sarcastically when Nemtsov mentioned the 
development of democracy in Ukraine and how Russia should take a lesson from 
it. Zatulin’s position on Russia's approach to the situation did not differ in any 
remarkable way from Nemtsov's, except that he stated, rather vaguely, that 
Russia should not permit any “outside interference” (presumably Western) in 
Ukrainian affairs. (14)  Thus, while the debate prompted a sometimes heated 
exchange over differing interpretations of developments in the neighboring 
country, there was general agreement as to the role Russia should play, and it 
tended to support the position currently taken by the president and the Foreign 
Ministry. 
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Nemtsov is correct that, when compared to 2004, the official Russian reaction to 
the current Ukrainian crisis is different. It is, as Nemtsov said, more “measured 
and careful,” but also much less active. It is notable, for instance, that prior to 
Putin’s telephone conversation with Yushchenko on Friday, the Ukrainian 
president had already spoken with EU Foreign Relations Commissioner Benito 
Farrerro-Waldner and with Lithuanian President Waldas Adamkus. (15)  When 
Putin did finally act, he was careful to speak first with Yushchenko and not with 
Yanukovich – a gesture of recognition of Yushchenko’s status as president.  
 
In a somewhat paradoxical turn of events, experience has proven that 
democracy in Ukraine, Zatulin’s eye-rolling notwithstanding, actually tends to 
favor a pro-Russian orientation, as has been demonstrated by the resurgence of 
Yanukovich’s Party of Regions, since the Orange Revolution. If that is indeed the 
case, then whether or not Yushchenko wins this particular battle and succeeds in 
holding another round of elections is of no great consequence to Ukraine’s 
orientation vis-à-vis Russia, since the Party of Regions may simply rebound. It 
also means that in terms of political interference, Russia should heed a policy of 
"the less, the better," with regard to keeping Ukraine inclined toward it. The 
question is whether the current policy of restraint will continue, or whether the 
temptation to intervene—perhaps, as Zatulin indicated, out of concern for 
“outside interference”—will become too great to resist.      
 
Meanwhile, there are signs that Yushchenko may be softening the stance he had 
announced on April 2. It has recently become known that, following Easter 
services in the Vladimir cathedral, Yushchenko announced that the early 
elections he had scheduled for May 27 would be postponed indefinitely (pending 
a decision by the Constitutional Court). (16)  According to other reports, 
Yushchenko repeatedly has denied that elections would be delayed. Since, 
unfortunately, the details of the telephone conversation between the two 
presidents two nights before probably will never be known, one can only 
speculate about whether or not Putin's intervention had any effect on 
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Yushchenko’s change of heart. It may be that the Yanukovych camp will have no 
need for any Russian support after all: Yushchenko himself may ensure its 
triumph. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Armenian elections: RIP Andranik Markarian, romantic pragmatist 
There is probably no opportune moment to die, but the heart attack that took the 
life of Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Markarian on March 25 could not have 
come at a worse time for Armenian politics. With the death of Markarian, former 
Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian was appointed acting prime minister on April 4, 
a post that he had hoped to win in upcoming parliamentary elections. The May 
12 date of the country’s elections is fast approaching, and the scrum underway 
between the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) and its newly formed 
rival, Bargavach Hayastan (BH), or Prosperous Armenia party, is merely a 
prelude to next year’s presidential elections. In the pre-election tussle between 
pro-government factions, Makarian was a prime mediator who labored 
unobtrusively to align the ruling HHK party with the agenda of Armenia’s most 
powerful figures, President Robert Kocharian and Defense Minister Sarkisian. 
Now that Sarkisian occupies the premiership, he may find that his early 
appointment has confounded his earlier designs to line up support for a 
presidential bid in 2008. Without the cooperation of Markarian to ameliorate intra-
party strife, Sarkisian faces a wary and divided pro-government coalition. 
             
Loyalty proved a prudent career strategy for Markarian, who won his appointment 
in May 2000 by defecting to the president’s camp in the chaos following the 
assassination of his predecessor, the late Prime Minister Vazgen Sarsian, on the 
floor of parliament in October 1999. (1)  In the years thereafter, Makarian gained 
distinction as the longest-serving prime minister in the short history of 
independent Armenia. His long service is testament to his popularity, as was the 
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outpouring of sympathy from global leaders at his passing. In a statement issued 
by the US chargé d’affaires in Yerevan, Makarian was described as a valuable 
partner of the United States: “We honor Prime Minister Markarian's lifelong 
contributions to Armenian life, from his work with the dissident National Unity 
Party during the 1960s and 1970s, through independent Armenia's emergence 
from Soviet rule, and as the head of government since 2000.” (2) Condolences 
arrived from the Kremlin as well, where President Putin addressed his regrets to 
President Kocharian in particular, for the loss of a loyal minister. (3)  Markarian’s 
stabilizing influence on Armenian politics was widely acknowledged, and his 
loyalty to the government of Kocharian will be sorely missed in the tumultuous 
lead-up to parliamentary and presidential elections. 
             
Markarian was a pivotal figure holding together the contentious factions within his 
ruling HHK party, while balancing the growing power of the rival BH party. In the 
pre-election power shuffle he was cast to play a key role as placeholder for 
former Defense Minister Sarkisian, who planned to use the premiership as a 
stepping stone en route to the presidential office in 2008. In exchange for 
accepting a demotion within the HHK, of which he was the nominal head, 
Markarian was to be handed the post of parliamentary speaker, following 
parliamentary elections in May. The political bargain would have amounted to a 
double victory for Sarkisian, to whom the current parliamentary speaker and 
veteran HHK member, Tigran Torosian, is an untested and unreliable ally. Signs 
that Markarian might have been a willing pawn in the former defense minister’s 
presidential gambit began to emerge as early as the summer of 2006, when his 
authority as HHK party leader began to wane with the ascendance of Sarkisian. 
By January 2007, Markarian admitted that he would lose his post as prime 
minister, following May elections. By way of explanation he told reporters, “I think 
romantically but am a pragmatist.” (4) 
             
The appointment of Sarkisian as interim prime minister may ultimately prove 
disadvantageous to his presidential designs. As minister of defense, he 
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exercised a free hand in pursuing political and economic interests, with discretion 
over large shares of government spending. (5)  Though his former position 
lacked the prominence of the premiership, Sarkisian faced less party opposition 
as defense minister than he will in the halls of parliament, where his rise to power 
within the HHK already has exacerbated tensions between his “old guard” and 
loyalists to the late Prime Minister Markarian. (6)  The impending election date of 
May 12 does not afford Sarkisian much time to consolidate his control within the 
party and to contain the growing influence of Armenia’s leading opposition party, 
the BH.  
             
Outmaneuvering the BH may well prove to be the simpler of the two tasks. 
Indeed, the opposition challenge may even provide the prime minister with a 
convenient means to unite the contentious factions of the HHK. The suggestion 
that the BH poses a real threat to Sarkisian’s presidential ambitions is of doubtful 
merit. The Prosperous Armenia party, founded in December 2005 by oligarch 
Gagik Tsarukian, is firmly allied with President Kocharian, and is unlikely to 
challenge his hand-picked successor to the executive office. Although it has 
positioned itself as an opposition party by co-opting cultural and political 
dissidents, the BH lacks a well-defined ideological or policy profile to mark it off 
from its rivals; in his founding statement, Tsarukian explained his decision to play 
a substantive role in Armenian politics in non-committal terms by saying, “I see 
some unsolved problems in both the socioeconomic and political fields. I believe 
that our party, which will be a party of strong and clean people, will be able to 
make its contribution to solving those problems.” (7)  Although the party claims a 
constituency of 370,000 “strong and clean” members (roughly ten percent of the 
total population of Armenia), (8) the power of the BH is limited by a bland policy 
program spelled out in a 33 page manifesto, the prodigality of which undermines 
its very credibility. (9)  Impeded by a poorly-defined policy profile, the BH 
resembles nothing so much as a parliamentary faction, engineered to advance 
the careers of loyalists and to serve the government as a straw-man, drawing 
support away from the country’s weak and divided opposition parties. An 
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Armenian journalist critical of the government’s mismanagement of the electoral 
process characterized Tsarukian as an unwitting Trojan horse, on which 
Sarkisian will ride into the presidential office. (10) Although the metaphor of a 
Trojan horse is ill-suited to its object, paper tiger being perhaps a more apt 
representation of the role of the BH party in electoral maneuverings, the author’s 
accusation of political connivance is clear enough. Domestic developments are 
unlikely to affect Armenia's close relationship with Moscow. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kyrgyz president faces mounting pressure to resign 
Once again Kyrgyzstan is in the throes of a deep political crisis, this time pitting 
former Prime Minister Feliks Kulov against President Kurmanbek Bakiev, as the 
country’s two predominant opposition movements (Kulov’s “United Front For A 
Worthy Future for Kyrgyzstan” and “For Reforms!”) call for a new constitution, 
early presidential elections and for President Bakiev’s resignation.  It is the latter 
demand that threatens to plunge Kyrgyzstan into a new round of civil unrest.  
Over the past few weeks the president has taken a number of steps to appease 
the opposition, including appointing opposition leader Almaz Atambaev (chair of 
the Social Democratic party) as prime minister and establishing a “working 
group” to begin considering (new) constitutional reform.   However, he refuses to 
step down or call early elections and consequently, opposition leaders are 
moving forward with their plans to stage large-scale protests in Bishkek on 11 
April, à la the Tulip Revolution.  (1)  Depending on how Bakiev’s supporters in the 
southern provinces respond (Bakiev is from Jalalabad Province and one of his 
brothers, Akmat, is said to be the unofficial "governor, prosecutor, and khan” of 
Jalalabad) (2), 11 April could bring widespread unrest throughout the country. 
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Following calls for compromise by various parliamentarians, NGO leaders and 
Prime Minister Atambaev himself, the “United Front For A Worthy Future for 
Kyrgyzstan” offering President Bakiev the semblance of an olive branch by 
announcing on 5 April that if Bakiev accepted the draft of the revised constitution, 
which United Front leaders would had given to State Secretary Adaham 
Madumarov by the next day, the 11 April demonstrations would be called off. (3)  
This rather half-hearted attempt at peace-making was rejected unequivocally on 
6 April, when Bakiev told the Vecherniy Bishkek newspaper that he would not 
submit the opposition’s draft constitution to parliament, because such an act 
would violate current constitutional law.  The president said that he supported 
constitutional reform, but only if it was carried out in accordance with the law, 
which stipulates that a draft must first be submitted by a “working group” to the 
president, who submits it to parliament.  Upon receiving parliamentary approval, 
the document must then be endorsed by the Constitutional Court. (4) 
 
The working group for constitutional reform had been established one day prior 
to the president’s newspaper interview, made up of the following members: 
Prime Minister Almaz Atambaev, who chairs the group; Ishenbai Abdurazakov, 
former state secretary; Dzhanyl Alieva, head of the Pervomai district court in 
Bishkek; Azimbek Beknazarov, formerly a leading member of the “For Reforms!” 
movement and now co-chair of the  “For One Kyrgyzstan” movement; Bektur 
Zulpiev, chief of a department within the presidential administration; Ishak 
Masaliev, leader of the Communist party; Isa Omurkulov, member of parliament 
and until recently a leader of  “For Reforms!”; Roza Otunbaeva, co-chair of  “For 
One Kyrgyzstan”; Nurlan Sadykov, director of the Institute of Constitutional 
Policy, Dooronbek Sadyrbaev, co-founder of “For One Kyrgyzstan”; and 
Tursunbek Akun, chair of the Human Rights Commission in the presidential 
administration.  The current leadership of “For Reforms!” and the United Front 
refused to nominate any representatives to the group, having already presented 
its demands to the president’s administration. (5)  Past attempts at constitutional 
reform have dragged on for months, but this time a draft document was ready in 
 33 
just five days: on 10 April, MP Dooronbek Sadyrbaev announced that the draft 
was complete and included amendments previously proposed by Feliks Kulov 
and other leaders of the United Front and “For Reforms!” movements on the 
issue of power-sharing between the executive and legislative branches of 
government.  (6)   Later that day, Prime Minister Atambaev told the press that 
Bakiev had signed the draft and passed it on to the Jogorku Kengesh 
(parliament), which will begin considering the document 11 April.  The prime 
minister promised that as soon as the new constitution was approved, its 
measures would be implemented (7) and then went on to declare that the 
opposition’s demands had been met and there was no longer any need for 
confrontation. (8)  Compared with the first eighteen months of Bakiev’s rule, this 
sudden spate of activity represents a virtual whirlwind of political reform. 
 
In his 10 April television address President Bakiev criticized the opposition more 
directly, stating “All of opposition's demands have not only been heard, they have 
been met. Today, there are no grounds or reasons to call people out into the 
streets. That is why I state that the people who started this are responsible for 
any illegal actions and riots.” (9)  He castigated the opposition leaders for 
rejecting his recent invitations to discuss their demands with him and for 
boycotting the constitutional working group, and then accused them of planning 
to forcibly oust him from power, “A strategy of overthrowing the regime illegally 
through a state coup is being implemented.” (10)  However, the opposition shows 
no signs of backing down and continues to call for new presidential elections and 
Bakiev’s resignation.  United Front spokesperson Emil Aliev told the media, “The 
authorities want to smooth things out on the eve of our protests. But it's not going 
to work. Our demands are the same: Bakiyev's resignation and early presidential 
elections.” (11) 
 
Preparations are well underway in Bishkek to provide shelter for the 50,000 
opposition supporters who are expected to arrive by 11 April.  70 felt yurts and 30 
tents are being erected in Bishkek’s main square, (12) and the United Front’s 
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press service has posted an official schedule and route for the various groups of 
demonstrators to follow – opposition supporters are to gather in a number of 
different spots at noon and approach Ala-Too Square in seven columns. (13)  At 
least 100 people have arrived already from the oblasts of Naryn and Issyk-Kul.  
Law enforcement personnel are making their own preparations and have erected 
large tents to house Interior Ministry troops east and west of the government 
buildings. (14)  Kulov has assured his supporters that he is certain the police will 
not use force against the demonstrators because many of them agree with the 
protesters’ demands. (15)  Of course, he also still may command some influence 
over the security services, harking back to the days when he headed the Interior 
Ministry. 
 
Anti-government protests in the northeastern provinces began as early as 9 April 
in Talas (provincial capital of Talas Oblast’), Ak-Taala, Chayek, At-Bashi,  
Kochkor (all in Naryn Oblast’), Cholpon-Ata, Karakol, Balykchy (all in Issyk-Kul 
Oblast’), in the town of Chuy-Tokmak, and in Panfilov, Moscow and Alamedin 
Districts (all in Chuy Oblast’). (16)  Opposition sympathizers from these areas, as 
well as from the southern oblasts of Jalalabad and Batken are all expected to 
travel to Bishkek for the 11 April rally. (17) 
 
The former prime minister and his supporters have been absolutely steadfast in 
their resolve to force the president to meet every last one of their demands, 
including their demand for his resignation.  This resolve is no doubt fueled by 
months’ of pent-up frustration with the excruciatingly slow pace of  reform and 
their own inability to achieve meaningful change by using established political 
procedures – when parliament finally succeeded in revising the constitution last 
November, nearly all of the revisions were nullified a month later.  Thus, it is 
small wonder that once he was no longer part of the government, Kulov would 
turn to extra-legal means to achieve his ambitions.  His new opposition 
movement has found support from a surprisingly large number of 
parliamentarians and other opposition figures, as well as from a number of 
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government officials.  In fact, rumor has it that he has also garnered the support 
of the Kremlin and that a candidate to replace Bakiev is waiting in Moscow.  In an 
interview with AKIpress on 5 April, Deputy Speaker of the Jogorku Kengesh 
Kubanychbek Isabekov, stated that Kyrgyzstan soon would be receiving a visit 
from Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, to address the subject of 
installing a 40-year old former security services official with the surname Aliev as 
head of Kyrgyzstan’s government, due to Moscow’s dissatisfaction with 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. (18) 
 
Whether or not there is any truth to this rumor, Bakiev seems to have exhausted 
his support both inside and outside his own country, except for in his home 
oblast’ of Jalalabad, where his family still exerts a great deal of influence.  
Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev criticized Bakiev’s inability to preserve 
his country’s stability, in a television interview on the situations in Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. (19)  After having ridden into office on a wave of reformist euphoria, 
Bakiev has proven himself to be a stubborn and ineffective leader, unwilling to 
implement political reform if it meant relinquishing any of the presidency’s powers 
to other branches of government.  His recent scramble to carry out several of the 
opposition’s demands (demands that date back to the beginning of his 
presidency) only serves to underscore his desperation to retain his post, a 
desperation which Kulov and the “For Reforms!” leaders plainly see.  Bakiev’s 
frantic attempts to placate the opposition are clearly too little, too late – Kulov and 
company seem to sense they have him on the ropes, and it is highly unlikely that 
they will stop at anything less than total victory, i.e. Bakiev’s resignation.  The 
one remaining question is whether or not Bakiev’s desperation will cause him to 
cling to his position at any cost, or if he will finally allow the welfare of his 
country’s citizens to supersede his personal ambitions. 
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UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s politicians settle in for the long haul 
 On 2 April, President Viktor Yushchenko’s signature on a decree dissolving the 
parliament began a period of heated rhetoric, posturing and uncertainty.  On 10 
April, however, Yushchenko altered his position in favor of negotiation – and 
perhaps some type of agreement.  
 
In talks with Yanukovych, Yushchenko reportedly offered to “suspend” his 
decree, in order to allow more time for new elections to be prepared.  They are 
currently set for 27 May.  (1) 
 
The task for Yushchenko today, however, is to ensure that any agreement does 
not jeopardize the position he has carefully carved out for himself and his allies.  
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When he dissolved parliament, Yushchenko accused members of parliament of 
conducting a “fraudulent policy of intrigues and betrayals,” in order to 
unconstitutionally increase the majority coalition.  He called this a “threat to our 
country and nation.”   (2)   
 
The move signified a strong return to political relevance for Yushchenko, who 
had become isolated and seen his powers drastically reduced.  
 
Parliament immediately refused to uphold the presidential decree.   MPs called 
protestors out onto the streets, warned of “a split” between the East and West of 
the country, appealed the decree to the Constitutional Court, announced a 
boycott of the new elections, and suggested that new presidential elections be 
held.  
 
But on 9 April, both Yanukovych and Yushchenko sounded a conciliatory note.  
In an interview published in the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Yanukovych 
called for compromise and seemed to accept the idea of a new election, but not 
on 27 May.  “Elections cannot take place on 27th May, as President Yushchenko 
is demanding,” he said. If, of course, we are talking of honest and democratic 
elections - it is necessary to decide on many technical questions, [and] form 
election commissions.”  (3) 
 
Yushchenko, for his part, announced a 15 point compromise plan, which included 
everything from committing to pass certain legislation, to “restoring a balance” 
among various political forces, to supporting the idea of new elections.  It was 
unclear, though, just what Yushchenko hoped to accomplish with most of these 
points and what he is prepared to sacrifice, in order to reach an agreement. 
 
In response to a question from reporters, Yushchenko suggested that he is 
willing to talk about the possibility of pushing the new election back, in order to 
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provide better preparation time.  “This can be discussed in the negotiations,” he 
said. (4) 
 
However, in order to move the elections back, Yushchenko would have to either 
rescind or reissue his decree.  Article 77 of the Ukrainian constitution says, 
“Extraordinary elections [to the] Supreme Soviet of Ukraine are appointed by 
[the] President of Ukraine and conducted [within] the period of sixty days from the 
day of publishing of the decision about stopping of plenary powers of the 
Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.” (5)   
 
The decree was published on April 3.  The current election is set for 27 May, or 
55 days after the publication of the decree.  Adding the constitutional five extra 
days would place the election on a Friday.  
 
This would lead to a host of questions, most notably regarding a string of rash 
legislation “passed” by parliament, following its dissolution.  Parliament has 
rescinded some of these “laws,” in an attempt to convince Yushchenko to 
capitulate.  It is unclear, however, how parliament would make use of any extra 
time provided to it, particularly since Speaker Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party 
may not reach the next parliament. 
 
Yanukovych also likely is looking for a guarantee that Yushchenko will not stand 
in the way of his reappointment as prime minister, if his party should secure a 
parliamentary majority following the election.  Furthermore, he and his allies no 
doubt would like guarantees that their business interests will not be undercut or 
targeted for investigation, should the opposition form a majority.  Agreements for 
immunity on any questionable activities conducted by government ministers also 
likely will be requested, as will concessions regarding possible posts in a new 
opposition-led government, in regional administrations, or in the country’s 
industrial monopolies. 
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On 11 April, Yanukovych ratcheted up the rhetoric again when he insisted that he 
would agree only to parliamentary elections held simultaneously with presidential 
elections. (6)  It is likely that Yushchenko would lose these elections.  
 
Yushchenko must be careful not to give away too much, however.  His tendency 
to do so in the past allowed Yanukovych to isolate him and undermine his 
authority.  It also allowed a return of certain tactics that were thought to have 
been banished during the Orange Revolution of 2004.  These tactics included 
pressure (both legal and physical) on media outlets and what appeared to be 
open intimidation of political opponents.  
 
As noted previously in The Analyst, during March representatives from Ukraine’s 
Prosecutor-General’s Office (PGO) suddenly searched the apartment of former 
Interior Minister and former Orange Revolution organizer Yuriy Lutsenko.  The 
parliament then asked the PGO to investigate former Prime Minister and Orange 
Revolution leader Yulia Tymoshenko’s dealings as head of a gas intermediary in 
the mid-1990s.   Both Lutsenko and Tymoshenko had announced that they would 
lead major protest actions in the spring. (7) 
 
At the same time, the Ukrainian National Television Channel 1 cancelled its only 
political debate program, Toloka, after Tymoshenko and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko of 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc appeared on the program.  This followed on the 
heels of a number of incidents of reported pressure against local and regional 
media outlets. (8)  These tactics do not suggest a government that is moving 
toward consolidating an open, transparent democracy.    
 
Yushchenko so far is in the “power” position.  He seized the initiative on 2 April 
and has not released it.  Yanukovych’s allies have been unable to mount 
effective street protests, never matching the numbers promised.  The decision by 
five Constitutional Court judges to recuse themselves from the case, and the 
delay in the Court’s hearing of the arguments does not bode well for a quick 
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decision – or perhaps for any decision at all.  Therefore, the President’s decree 
remains in effect.  
 
Yushchenko has the chance to protect the gains made by Ukraine in 2004.  
Yanukovych has the chance to transform his party into an organization truly 
representing the will of his voters.  The true goals of both will become clear as 
their negotiations continue.  
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